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Abstract: We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show 
how  a  false  belief  about  off-path  play  is  the  key  element  underlying  both  the  Lucas 
Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the 
impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker’s 
incorrect  beliefs  about  off-path  play  can  lead  to  the  adoption  of  mistaken  policy 
innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the 
belief that motivated them was wrong. In contrast, play may never escape an undesirable 
self-confirming  equilibrium,  as  the  action  implied  by  the  mistaken  belief  does  not 
generate data that contradicts it; escape from the self-confirming equilibrium requires that 
players do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off-path actions.  
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“The fact that nominal price and wages tend to rise more rapidly at 
the peak of the business cycle than they do in the trough has been 
recognized from the time when the cycle was first perceived as a 
distinct  phenomenon.  The  inference  that  permanent  inflation  will 
therefore  induce  a  permanent  economic  high  is  no  doubt  equally 
ancient,  yet it is only recently that this notion has undergone the 
mysterious transformation from obvious fallacy to the cornerstone 
of economic policy.”          
Robert E. Lucas Jr. [1976] 
1. Introduction 
  Thinking of equilibrium as the result of non-equilibrium learning suggests that 
players  are  likely  to  be  better  informed  about  the  consequences  of  actions  on  the 
equilibrium path than off the equilibrium path. Indeed, if play converges to equilibrium 
and  players  have  many  observations,  then  we  should  expect  players  to  have  correct 
beliefs about the equilibrium outcome.
3  But by definition, off-path actions are never 
observed in equilibrium, which raises the possibility that incorrect beliefs about of-path 
play might persist for quite some time. Following Fudenberg and Levine [2006], we call 
a belief that is objectively false a “superstition.”
4  
   There are two manifestations of the role of off-path superstitions. One is the sort 
of  “econometric  policy  evaluation”  that  was  the  focus  of  the  famous  Lucas  critique: 
namely, a behavioral parameter that is estimated under one government policy may not 
be invariant to changes in that policy.  Moreover, the false belief that the parameter is 
policy-invariant may lead to the adoption of mistaken government policies. For example, 
econometric estimation on the equilibrium path may make certain types of poor economic 
policies (“permanent inflation”) appear desirable.
5  
Although the macroeconomics literature has focused on the Lucas critique, the 
opposite sort of off-path superstitions can be longer-lasting, and thus potentially worse: 
                                                 
3 At least if players observe the path of play, which we will assume throughout this essay. See Dekel et al 
[2004] for a discussion of some cases where players observe less information than this.  
4 F u d e n b e r g  a n d  L e v i n e  [ 2 0 0 6 ]  a n a l y z e  o f f - p a t h  e x p e r imentation  in  greater  detail.  They  show  that 
superstitions about play two or more steps off the equilibrium path can be persistent as the discount factor 
goes to 1, even though patient players will experiment enough with off-path actions to reject false beliefs 
about play one step off of the equilibrium path. 
5 Michael Woodford argues that what we call the “self-confirming case” is also covered by the original 
Lucas critique. Robert E. Lucas Jr. in private communication indicates that his primary concern was with 
the inaccuracy of the prevalent econometric models, and that he was not concerned at the time with the 
game theoretic distinction we make here. Thus although the historical record is ambiguous, it is consistent 
with our formulation of the Lucas critique.   2 
Some desirable policies may fail to be adopted because of superstitions that make them 
appear undesirable. This idea is the basis of self-confirming equilibrium. In the Lucas 
critique case, we may expect that if a policy is implemented based on superstitions about 
its consequences, we will learn that these superstitions are false, and the defective policy 
will be dropped. Indeed – the argument that permanent inflation might be a desirable 
policy seems to have dropped off the radar since the mid-70s. On the other hand, if a 
policy is not implemented at all because of a superstition about its consequences, no new 
data is generated, and the situation is likely to persist – which is why a “self-confirming 
equilibrium” is an “equilibrium.”  
  Our  goal  here  is  to  illustrate  the  basic  concepts  of  superstitions  and  self-
confirming  equilibrium  through  a  series  of  examples  inspired  by  the  macroeconomic 
literature. We examine also how quickly we might expect mistakes to be detected, and 
the welfare cost of initially incorrect beliefs when players are rational Bayesians.  Our 
focus is on how these welfare costs vary depending on whether the superstitions lead to a 
deviation from the equilibrium path or not. 
2. The “Lucas Critique” Model 
  A modest variation on the simple peasant-dictator game used to illustrate the basic 
problem of time-consistency can also be used to illustrate the Lucas Critique. In peasant-
dictator, there is a peasant who moves first and must decide whether or not to undertake 
an investment: whether to plant corn or eat the corn seed. If the peasant eats the corn, the 
dictator gets nothing and the peasant gets one. If the peasant plants the corn, then the 
dictator must decide how much of the corn growing in the field to appropriate. Suppose 
that planting the corn results in four units of corn. We may imagine that the dictator 
decides between the “high tax” action of taking all the corn, yielding a utility of four for 
herself and a utility of zero for the peasant, and the “low tax” action of taking one unit of 
corn, resulting in one units of utility for herself and three units of utility for the peasant. 
  The traditional time-consistency problem, as analyzed, for example, by Kydland 
and Prescott [1977], is easy to see. In subgame perfect equilibrium, after the fact, it is 
optimal for the dictator to take all the corn. Anticipating this, the peasant prefers to eat 
the corn, resulting in one unit of utility for herself and none for the dictator. By way of 
contrast, ex ante if the dictator could commit to a “low tax” action, the peasant would   3 
grow the corn, and the dictator would get one, the peasant three, both being better off 
than in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
  To put this into the context of Lucas’ critique, suppose that the dictator can make 
a commitment to a policy prior to the move by the peasant, and that three policies are 
available: Always set the low tax, always set the high tax, and set the low tax unless there 
is a “war” in which case set the high tax. Suppose that the probability of a “war” is 50-50. 
The key element about a “war” is that it is objectively ascertainable whether or not there 
is a war so that it is possible to determine if the dictator follows the commitment, and that 
a “war” occurs only  after the decision to  grow is made. Notice that in practice, that 
dictators  have  committed  themselves  to  policies  of  this  type  through  institutional 
arrangements, for example requiring a vote of parliament to raise taxes.  
  In this commitment setting, commitment to low tax results means the peasant will 
grow the corn, that the dictator will get one and the peasant three. Commitment to a high 
tax means of course that the dictator gets nothing and the peasant one. Commitment to 
tax only in case of “war” means that by growing the corn the peasant gets an expected 
utility of one and a half, while by not growing the corn a utility of only one. In other 
words, it is still optimal for the peasant to grow the corn, and the dictator now gets two 
and a half, the peasant one and a half. Hence we see that the optimal commitment is to 
tax only in case of “war.” 
  What then does this have to do with Lucas? Suppose now that this game is played 
for  a  number  of  generations  and  the  enterprising  econometrician  comes  along.  The 
econometrician regresses government income on the tax rate. In the “high taxes only in 
war” policy, there is variation in the tax rate – sometimes taxes are low and sometimes 
they are high, so it is possible to estimate that low taxes result in a government income of 
one, and high taxes a government income of four. The econometrician recommends to the 
dictator that to maximize government revenue the best policy would be to charge a high 
tax all the time. Of course if the peasant knows about this change in policy, then (pace 
Lucas) he will stop growing corn and start eating it, and in fact government revenue will 
fall to zero. This, in a nutshell, is the Lucas Critique: a structural relation (between taxes 
and revenues) estimated under one policy regime (high tax only when “war”) leads to a 
recommendation of a regime change (high tax always) that in turn results in a change in 
the structural relation.   4 
  There are two points about this that we want to make. First, the problem pointed 
out by Lucas is mitigated by the fact that policy makers will eventually discover that the 
new policy is a mistake. In the example, after the new policy is implemented government 
revenues will fall to zero, so we imagine that the policy will ultimately be rescinded. This 
is not to say that the social cost of failed policy experiments must be small, or that the 
mistakes will always be discovered quickly; we say more about this issue of speed of 
detection below.    
  On  the  other  hand,  the  problem  pointed  out  by  Lucas  is  a  manifestation  of a  
deeper issue: if we are in an equilibrium, to an extent, we can see only the equilibrium 
path,  and  our  information  about  what  happens  off  the  equilibrium  path  is  either 
conjecture (such as the econometrician who conjectures the structural relationship will 
not change) or based on limited evidence from previous deviations from the equilibrium 
path. 
  One point of course is that there is no substitute for genuine understanding of 
causality.  That  is,  deep  theoretical  models  supported  by  strong  evidence  that  the 
parameters are true constants – aspects of preferences, for  example – tested across a 
broad  range  of  places  and  times  –  may  give  us  confidence  in  understanding  the 
consequences of policies for which there is no direct experience. 
  The second point is that we may find ourselves in a situation opposite of the one 
envisaged by Lucas: that is, the superstition about the consequences of off-path play, 
rather than leading us to test a bad policy, may instead convince us not to implement a 
good policy. We examine this next. 
3. Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
3.1 An Example 
  We  consider  a  simple  game  involving  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI).  We 
imagine that there are two countries, East and West, and that they must decide between 
two economic policies:  one of  awarding monopolies to foreign investors, and one of 
forcing foreign competitors to compete. As a more concrete example, you may wish to 
think of the monopolies in question as either patent or copyright protection; in fact patent   5 
monopolies originated in the late Middle Ages as a way to induce skilled artisans to 
relocate (see for example Landes [1969]). 
  Following the choice of policy by the two countries, there is a single multinational 
investor  who  must  determine  how  to  allocate  two  units  of  FDI  in  each  of  the  two 
countries.  The  options  are:  (a)  Invest  one  unit  each  in  East  and  West;  (b)  invest 
everything  in  East;  (c)  invest  everything  in  West,  and  (d)  do  not  invest  at  all.  We 
normalize payoffs so that if there is no investment in a country, this generates zero for 
both the country and the multi-national. If there is a unit of investment in a country, under 
monopoly this results in a return of one for the country and two for the investor, while 
under competition this results in a return of three for the country and one for the investor. 
Note  that  the  key  feature  of  monopoly  in  this  example  is  that  it  is  beneficial  to  the 
monopolist, but the social costs exceed that benefit. 
  To generate some variation in policy, let us also suppose that there is a probability 
of 10% that one of the governments is “socialist” and refuses to grant monopolies. One 
particular sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is for all non-socialist governments 
to grant a monopoly, and for the investor to split investment between countries granting a 
monopoly, or, if one country is socialist, to invest entirely in the  country that is not 
socialist. 
  Now  we  suppose  that  economic  policy  can  be  set  for  both  countries  by  an 
international  agency,  which  we  will  call  the  “WIPO.”  The  WIPO  cares  only  about 
economic  welfare  –  that  is  it  receives  utility  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  utility  to  the 
government  and  to  the  investor.  Suppose  over  some  period  of  time  we  are  in  the 
equilibrium  described  above  in  which  the  WIPO  policy  is  that  both  countries  grant 
monopolies  –  except  for  the  occasional  socialist  government  that does  not  feel  itself 
bound  by  WIPO  rules.  The  WIPO  econometricians  estimate  the  relationship  between 
welfare and monopoly using data on each individual country. They conclude that not 
offering a monopoly results in a welfare of zero. Offering a monopoly results in a welfare 
of three 90% of the time and six 10% of the time, so a welfare of 3.3. So the policy of 
offering a monopoly appears to be a good one. Of course the problem is that if neither 
country  offered  a  monopoly,  the  multi-national  would  still  optimally  invest,  so  the 
welfare per country would in fact be four.   6 
  Notice that we have assumed that both countries are not simultaneously socialist. 
If they were, then occasionally data would be generated showing that neither country 
offering a monopoly would result in a welfare of four. However: if the probability of a 
socialist government is only 10% and each country has an independent chance of being 
socialist, then both countries are socialist only 1% of the time, so the rate at which data is 
generated is quite low. We examine this more closely below. 
3.2 Overview of Learning and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
In the WIPO game, we have described a “self-confirming” equilibrium, in which 
each agent’s strategy is a myopic best response to his beliefs about the play of the other 
player(s) and are consistent with what is observed when the agent plays the game. That 
is, if the WIPO believes that failing to grant monopoly will result in zero welfare, this is 
consistent with what is observed on the equilibrium path in which monopoly is granted 
except when there is a socialist government, and given those beliefs, it is optimal not to 
grant the monopoly. In other words, beliefs are “self-confirming” because they do not 
induce  actions  that  generate  observations  that  disconfirm  the  beliefs.  However,  the 
outcome in which monopoly is always granted is also a Nash equilibrium: firms can 
“threaten”  to  never  invest  unless  the  WIPO  insists  all  non-socialist  countries  enforce 
patents. 
In this section of the paper, we want to informally present the assumptions on the 
learning process that underlies the concept of self-confirming equilibrium. That is, we 
want to highlight the assumptions under which the self-confirming equilibria of a game 
correspond  to  the  long-run  outcome  (steady  states  or  asymptotic  steady  states)  of  a 
learning  model.  We  will  then  discuss  how  modifying  the  assumptions  can  lead  to  a 
smaller  set  of  possible  long-run  outcomes  and  thus  provide  foundations  for  some 
“equilibrium refinements.”   
 A background assumption of all of the models we consider is that players learn 
the strategies of their opponents from repeated observations. To fix ideas, we will focus 
on models where agents keep explicit track of their beliefs about opponents play, and use 
these beliefs to guide their  behavior, so that the issues become how the player update   7 
their beliefs and how the beliefs guide their actions.
6 This makes it easier to discuss what 
we see as the main substantive assumptions and issues. 
First,  if  players  learn  from  the  data,  it  should  be  the  case  that  beliefs  are 
“asymptotically empirical:” once players have a great many observations of play at an 
information set, their beliefs should resemble the empirical distribution. This condition is 
implicit in the idea that players eventually learn the path of play, and is satisfied by 
Bayesian agents who think they are seeing draws from an exchangeable distribution. 
Second, self-confirming equilibrium reflects an element of strategic myopia.  That 
is,  players  do  not  attempt  to  influence  the  future  play  of  their  opponents  through 
punishments, rewards, or manipulation of their learning procedure. For example, patent-
granting  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  WIPO  game  might  be  sensible  in  a  repeated-game 
model.  It  might  be  that  forward  looking  multi-national  firms  might  feel  that  the 
reputational benefit of refusing to invest unless granted a monopoly is worth the short 
term  cost.  The  literature  on  learning  has  typically  ignored  these  forward  looking 
incentives, often making assumptions about random matching that eliminate them. For 
formal  modeling  of  learning  in  myopic  play,  see  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1993b], 
Fudenberg  and  Kreps  [1995],  and  Noldeke  and  Samuelson  [1993].  There  are  limited 
results on rational forward looking play – Kalai and Lehrer [1993] is one such example.
7 
In  our  discussion  we  will  maintain  the  assumption  of  myopic  incentives.  For  small 
individual players, or short-lived governments, this may be a reasonable assumption. 
Third, for learning theory to be relevant, players should not have priors that are 
too  strongly  held.  In  the  extreme  case,  players  might  have  point  beliefs  about  their 
opponents’ strategies, in which case no information would change their mind – and they 
would stubbornly believe anything regardless of the evidence. More interesting, from the 
perspective  of  learning  theory,  are  prior  beliefs  that  might  be  better  motivated  and 
strongly held, but not completely so, such as the belief that opponents behave rationally, 
or the belief that small changes in price will result in small changes in demand. The set of 
self-confirming equilibria includes outcomes that cannot arise with priors of this type;  
                                                 
6 Models of reinforcement learning, where players track only the rewards of each action, can have very 
similar properties event though the agents’ beliefs are not explicit. 
7 Jehiel [1998] consider Bayesian but boundedly rational players who care only about payoffs for the next 
  periods, and who believe that opponent’s play only depends on outcomes in the past   periods.  
   8 
restrictions on prior beliefs can lead to refinements of self-confirming equilibrium, most 
notably  in  “rationalizable  self-confirming  equilibrium  (RSCE)”  This  requires  players 
beliefs  about  the  opponent’s  strategies  to  be  consistent  with  the  idea  that  the  payoff 
functions  are  “almost  common  knowledge”  (see  Monderer  and  Samet  [1988]).  For 
example, the “patent equilibrium” in the WIPO game can be ruled out if we assume that 
WIPO knows (or is highly confident that it knows) the payoff functions of the firms, 
because it can then deduce how the firms will respond to a change in policy. The idea of 
an RSCE is close in spirit to Lucas’s argument that we should look for deep structural 
parameters: and in particular understand the preferences of players in the game.
8   
Fourth,  in  addition  to  the  strategic  myopia  assumed  above,  there  should  be 
asymptotic myopia, in the sense that eventually, once they have a great deal of evidence, 
players play a myopic best response to their beliefs, no longer experimenting to gather 
further information. If, for example, there are periodic regime shifts, then it would be 
desirable to experiment, even asymptotically. By way of contrast, asymptotic myopia is 
satisfied by rational Bayesian agents who believe the world is stationary (and have non-
doctrinaire  priors),  as  then  the  option  value  of  experimentation  decreases  to  zero  on 
almost all sample paths. (See, for example, Fudenberg and Levine [1993b].) 
In  addition,  for  all  of  the  self-confirming  equilibria  to  be  possible  long-run 
outcomes, it is necessary that there not be too so much experimentation at any point in 
the process, as otherwise players might learn the true distribution of off-path play. So, for 
example, extreme myopia would lead to self-confirming equilibrium. On the other hand, 
if players are more patient, then there is an option value to experimenting with off-path 
play, and as the players become more and more patient we expect them to experiment 
more and more.  If they experiment infinitely often at on-path information sets, they will 
learn  the  distribution  of  play  at  all  information  sets  that  are  “relevant”  to  the 
determination of Nash equilibrium.  Fudenberg and Kreps [1988,1996] use a model of 
exogenously given experimentation to show that this is enough to prevent convergence to 
non-Nash outcomes; Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] provide an analogous result about 
rational Bayesian learning with patient players, where the decision whether to experiment 
is endogenous.   
                                                 
8 I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  M i c h a e l  W o o d f o r d  s u g g ests  that  a  refinement  in  which  the  government 
“expects the worst” along the lines of ambiguity aversion theory might be appropriate.   9 
However,  these  results  do  not  provide  a  foundation  for  the  use  of  the  Nash 
equilibrium  concept  in  repeated  games,  as  they  do  not  pin  down  the  extent  of 
experimentation  at  off-path  information  sets.  It  turns  out  that  the  possible  long-run 
outcomes when players are patient is a refinement of Nash equilibrium called ”subgame-
confirmed Nash equilibrium (SCNE).” To understand the intuition for this equilibrium 
concept,  note  that  in  a  world  in  which  players  do  a  lot  of  experimenting  at  every 
information set that is on the equilibrium path, they will come to have correct beliefs 
about play one step off of the equilibrium path. This is why non-Nash outcome cannot 
persist. However, experimentation by on-path players forces their opponents to actually 
respond to some “off path” play, so that there is a cost to choosing suboptimal responses, 
while Nash equilibrium allows agents one step off the path of play to choose their actions 
arbitrarily.  Specifically,  the  “patent  equilibrium”  of  the  WIPO  game  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium – but involves the firm making investments that are not in fact optimal if the 
subgame has to actually be played. For this reason, if players are patient enough to rule 
out non-Nash self-confirming equilibria, then some of the Nash equilibria can be ruled 
out as well, which raises the question of just which outcomes can occur when players 
patient. Fudenberg and Levine [2006] provide a sufficient condition: The outcome of any 
SCNE can be generated by patient rational learning. 
To sum up, then: If play converges, then learning alone should lead at least to a 
self-confirming  equilibrium.
9  Learning  plus  reasoning  about  opponents’  incentives 
should lead to the further refinement of RSCE. Learning plus substantial experimentation 
with off-path play should lead instead to the further refinement of SCNE. Conveniently, 
in  two-stage  games  of  perfect  information,  both  RSCE  and  SCNE  are  equivalent  to 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In general, however, neither RSCE, nor SCNE allows the 
arbitrarily long chains of backwards induction implicit in subgame perfection.  
                                                 
9 T h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  w e  h a v e  a v o i d e d  t h e  i s s ue  of  whether  the  learning  system  will  in  fact 
converge, which is an important open research area.  If the system does not converge to a single profile but 
for example cycles, then the assumption that the players view the system as stationary is open to question. 
See  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  [1995].  In  the  macroeconomics  literature  the  issue  of  stability  of  learning 
procedures has been given more attention – see in particular Cho, Williams and Sargent [2002] who note 
the equivalence of Nash and self-confirming equilibrium paths in their model, but show how the instability 
of the self-confirming equilibrium leads the government to repeatedly “discover” too strong a version of the 
natural rate hypothesis.   10 
In the case of RSCE, long chains of backwards induction break down because a 
small prior probability that an opponent’s payoff function differs from its expected value 
can  become  a  large  posterior  probability  after  observing  an  unexpected  outcome. 
Subgame perfection corresponds to situations where the payoff functions are “common 
knowledge” or at least “common belief.” RSCE starts from the weaker assumption of 
almost-common-knowledge because assumptions based on common knowledge are not 
robust to arbitrarily small changes in the prior beliefs.
10 
 In the case of SCNE long chains of backwards induction break down because 
there is little value to experimenting at nodes that are off of the equilibrium path and 
consequently  reached  only  infrequently.    In  short,  learning  theory  points  us  either  to 
general  self-confirming  equilibria  (if  players  are  not  terribly  patient,  and  so  do  not 
experiment a great deal), or towards refinements of self-confirming equilibria if players 
use knowledge of opponents’ payoffs, or if they experiment a great deal.  
3.3  Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
To  provide  a  formal  definition  of  self-confirming  equilibrium  we  must  first 
specify some notation. For notational simplicity and conceptual clarity, we will restrict 
attention to games of perfect information. There are      players in the game, where 
player      is nature. We consider an extensive-form game, with a finite game tree 
consisting of nodes  .  The terminal nodes are  . The nodes at which player 
 has the move are denoted by    .  The feasible actions at a node   are denoted    . 
A pure strategy for player ,    , is an action at each node in     ,         ;     is 
the set of all such strategies. We denote by       profiles of all strategy profiles, and 
those of all players except player   respectively. l Each strategy profile determines a 
terminal node      . In interpreting the model, we suppose that all players know the 
structure  of  the  extensive  form,  so  that  each  player  knows  the  space     of  strategy 
profiles and can compute the function   . Each player   receives a payoff in the stage 
game  that  depends  on  the  terminal  node.  Player      payoff  function  is  denoted 
   .  We  let                    denote  the  largest  difference  in 
utility levels. 
                                                 
10 See Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine [1988], Dekel and Fudenberg [1990], and Borgers [1994].   11 
Let     denote the space of probability distributions over a set. Then a mixed 
strategy profile is  
  
    
   . In addition to mixed strategies, we define behavior 
strategies.  A  behavior  strategy  for  player  ,    ,  assigns  nodes       a  probability 
distribution over feasible actions,          ;     is the set of all such strategies.  
For  a  fixed    ,  the  marginal  probability  of  reaching  a  node       depends  on  the 
behavior strategies of the other players and is denoted      .  Let      be the subset 
of terminal nodes that are reachable when     is played, that is        if and only if for 
some          .  Similarly,  define       to  be  all  nodes  that  are  reachable 
under    , and extend this definition to mixed strategies       by requiring that the nodes 
or information sets be reachable with positive probability. We will also need to refer to 
the nodes that are reached with positive probability under  , denoted     .  
  We now model the idea that each player has a belief about his opponents’ play 
(including  the  play  of  Nature.)  Because  many  different  mixed  strategies  can  be 
observationally equivalent, it is easiest to model beliefs as a probability measure over 
   , the set of other players’ behavior strategies. Let     denote the belief of player .  
We may then define utility with respect to those beliefs by   
 

      

      
 
       

    
For a given mixed strategy profile    let     be the observationally equivalent 
behavior strategy.  We say that player ’s belief     is correct at an opponent   ’s node   
if                  .  This  will  be  used  to  capture  the  idea  that 
asymptotically  players  will  have  correct  beliefs  about  play  at  nodes  that  are  reached 
sufficiently  often.      At  the  least,  this  condition  will  apply  to  nodes  that  are  “on  the 
equilibrium path,” and it may be apply to some other nodes as well, depending on how 
patient the players are and thus much experimentation there is. 
Our first notion of equilibrium, self-confirming equilibrium, corresponds to the 
case of myopic players who do little or no experimentation. Consequently it imposes only 
the restriction that players learn what happens on the equilibrium path.  
Definition 3.1:     is a heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium if for each player   
and for each     with          there are beliefs       such that  
(a)     is a best response to      and    12 
(b)       is correct at every           
It is important to note that this definition allows player   to rationalize each     in the 
support of     with a different belief. This is relevant to models where of anonymous 
random matching in large populations. In those models, there will be many agents in the 
role of each player, and different agents may hold different beliefs. In case there is a 
single unitary agent for each player role, we would use the following stronger definition.  
Definition 3.2:     is a unitary self-confirming equilibrium if for each player  there are 
beliefs     and for each     with          such that  
(a)     is a best response to    and  
(b)     is correct at every       .
11 
 
By way of contrast, Nash equilibrium strengthens (b) to hold for all   .  
In  terms  of  observed  outcomes,  there  are  four  ways  that  self-confirming 
equilibrium can differ from Nash equilibrium. First, two players might have different 
beliefs about the play of a third player, as in the example of Fudenberg and Kreps [1988].  
This example relied on player 3’s off-path information set being reachable both by a 
deviation of player 1 and by a deviation by player 2; it cannot arise in the games of 
perfect information we consider here, nor in games with only two players. The second 
sort of non-Nash outcome arises when a player’s beliefs about the off-path play of the 
opponents corresponds to a correlated strategy; this too cannot occur in games with only 
two players.  Next, different agents in the role of a different player can have different 
beliefs, as we illustrate below.  Finally, if the distribution of Nature’s move is not known 
a priori,  but learned  in the same way as the distribution of opponents’ play, then even in 
a two-player game SCE can differ from Nash as the players may  have different beliefs 
about the off-path play of Nature. 
The difference between unitary and heterogeneous beliefs is easiest to see in a 
two-player  “Stackelberg  game”  of  complete  information:  player  1  picks  an 
action 1 {,} aU D   , player 2 observes  1 a  and plays  2 a  and then the game ends. Suppose 
                                                 
11 Battigallli [1987] defined an equivalent concept of “conjectural equilibrium” for two-player games with 
the  distribution  of  Nature’s  moves  known,  and  showed  that  in  these  games,  unitary  SCE  is  outcome-
equivalent to Nash equilibrium. He conjectured that this result extends to games with more players.    13 
that when player 1 plays D, player 2 plays N, and all agents in the role of player 1 know 
this. However, some player 1’s  incorrectly believe that player 2 will respond to U  with 
L,  and that payoffs are such that this belief makes D the best response for player 1, while 
other player 1’s correctly believe that player 2 responds to U with R, and that this belief 
makes U  optimal. Then we can have a heterogeneous SCE in which some player 1’s play 
U and some play D, even though this is not the outcome of any Nash equilibrium. 
In practice, the notion of heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium might not 
seems so relevant to a government which is a unitary actor, not a collection of agents 
fulfilling the role.  However, in macroeconomic settings, the non-governmental player – 
often a “representative” consumer – represents a great many players who may in fact play 
heterogeneously. 
Many experiments from the laboratory show the significance of self-confirming 
equilibrium. Two famous experiments, thought largely to contradict standard equilibrium 
theory, turn out largely to confirm the importance of self-confirming equilibrium. In the 
celebrated ultimatum bargaining experiment in which one party makes a binding take-it-
or-leave-it offer for dividing a sum of money, subgame perfection predicts that the first-
mover should get essentially all of the pie. This fails rather badly in the laboratory, where 
offers are closer to 50-50. 
A useful way to examine the data is by examining the losses that players suffer 
relative to the most that they could have earned given the objective play of the other 
players.  The  theory  of  self-confirming  equilibrium  informs  us  that  we  should  also 
distinguish between knowing losses and unknowing losses – the first correspond to losses 
that a player would know given his own play and the objective play of the other players, 
and the latter to losses that he could know about only by experimentation with alternative 
actions. So, for example, the player moving first in ultimatum bargaining has no knowing 
losses – he may well believe that any higher demand will be rejected, and so that his 
current demand is the best one. In the ultimatum bargaining experiments, Fudenberg and 
Levine [1997] show that the failure of subgame perfection is driven by knowing losses – 
the  fact  that  second  movers  are  willing  to  reject  ungenerous  offers.  However:  the 
unknowing losses of the first mover are in fact 3-5 times greater than the knowing losses 
of the second mover, indicating that self-confirming effects – the lack of knowledge of 
off-the-equilibrium-path play of opposing players is quantitative more significant than,   14 
for example, the often examined preferences for altruism and spite that are implicit in 
second mover play. 
In a similar vein, the surprising results of the centipede game, in which players 
have a chance to opt out, but if they choose not to, the social value doubles, while their 
private value decreases. Here again, the failure of subgame perfect equilibrium – which 
predicts dropping out in the first round, something that happens in the laboratory less 
than  3%  of  the  time  –  stems  from  interpersonal  preferences.  That  is,  some  players 
generously and intentionally give away money at the end of the game – this reverses the 
incentives for staying in earlier in the game. Yet here again, the unknowing losses of 
players who foolishly drop out too soon are seven times as large as that of the altruists 
playing at the end of the game.  
To put it a different way: laboratory experimentation has established that there are 
systematic, but small, deviations from the assumption that individuals act to maximize 
expected utility functions for their own monetary income only – and studying alternative 
preferences has become a huge industry. Yet the empirical fact is that the Lucas effect – 
the  lack  of  knowledge  of  off  the  equilibrium  path  play  –  is  quantitatively  far  more 
significant, on the order of five times as important.  
3.4 Rationalizable Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
Given beliefs over behavior strategies of other players     there are well-defined 
utility functions         , conditional on reaching the node  . A version of player  is 
a behavior strategy belief pair        . To get at rationalizability, we introduce the 
notion of a belief model which are sets of versions         . We say that a belief model 
is  belief  closed  if  for  every        ,  the  beliefs      are  consistent  with  being  a 
probability distribution over the types of other players, that is if  
                      
Definition 3.3:     is a rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE) if there is a 
belief closed model   such that 
(a)        maximizes          at all        
(b) if        then they induce the same distribution over terminal nodes as       15 
3.5 Subgame Confirmed Nash Equilibrium 
Definition 3.4:     is a subgame confirmed Nash  equilibrium (SCNE) if it is a Nash 
equilibrium,  and  for  each  node     that  is  one  step  off  of  the  equilibrium  path,  the 
strategies       are a self-confirming equilibrium of the subgame beginning at  . 
  To repeat the earlier discussion, the idea of this definition is that patient on-path 
players will experiment enough to learn the play one step off of the path. This is all that is 
needed for play to yield a Nash outcome. Because of this experimentation, players one 
step  off  the  path  of  play  will  learn  the  “continuation  path”  if  there  are  no  further 
deviations. The “ -step perfection” of Kalai and Neme [1992] is a stronger condition 
that requires a Nash equilibrium at every node   or fewer steps off the path. However, 
there is currently not a learning-theoretic foundation for  -step perfection. 
4. Applications in Macroeconomics 
  To illustrate the significance of self-confirming equilibrium, as well as some of its 
limitations, for macroeconomics, we examine three applications that have appeared in the 
literature. 
4.1. Hahn’s Conjectural Equilibrium 
  In  many  respects,  the  notion  of  self-confirming  equilibrium  is  anticipated  by 
Hahn’s [1977] notion of a “conjectural equilibrium.” In that paper he argues that firms 
accurately perceive their profit level, but incorrectly anticipate a fall in profits if they 
change the price they are currently charging. This leads to a model in which the price 
level can be arbitrary, as in the fixed-price models of Benassy [1975] and others. This 
application  is  most  interesting  because  it  illustrates  the  limitations  of  self-confirming 
equilibrium. In a setting where there are – either by accident or design – a great many 
small fluctuations – and firms generally engage in a variety of small variations in price, 
as do their rivals; and real price is constantly varying due to small changes in inflation – 
and payoffs are continuous in actions we would anticipate a gradual process of local 
adjustment, leading at least to a local maximum. This applies also to games played in the 
laboratory. In ultimatum bargaining, for example, if the grid of allowed offers is fine (as 
in most papers on play in these games) and if subjects play many times, it would be 
natural for them to experiment with asking for a nickel more to see if they can get it.   16 
However, subjects typically only get to play ten or so times; and because it takes several 
trials to estimate the fraction that reject any particular offer there is not incentive for them 
to do these experiments. By way of contrast, business firms get a great deal of feedback 
about the consequences of their pricing, so it is doubtful that prices are sticky on account 
of a belief by firms that whatever price they happen to be setting is optimal.  
  In  our  WIPO  example,  there  is  also  constant  generation  of  small  amounts  of 
information. However, the self-confirming equilibrium is locally stable in the sense that 
the small amounts of information – the elimination of monopoly in only one country – is 
misleading  about  the  consequences  of  eliminating  monopoly  in  both  countries.  Put 
differently – when we consider dynamic stability, we must recognize that while a self-
confirming equilibrium that is not Nash is not robust to the discovery of the entire truth, it 
may be robust to smaller discoveries. 
4.2. Alesina-Angeletos 
  We  give  a  simplified  version  of  Alesina  and  Angeletos  [2005]  model  of 
redistributional tax policy. The key idea is that voters care both about fairness and about 
efficiency. The government, reflecting the wishes of the government, chooses tax policy 
that can be more or less redistributional. Economic outcomes are influenced both by 
investment and luck. Even if the social optimum is a less redistributional policy that 
encourages investment, there may be a self-confirming equilibrium in which there is high 
redistribution. The idea is that the high level of redistribution discourages investment. 
What  voters  see  then  is  that  pre-tax  income  is  mostly  due  to  luck,  and  that  the 
redistributional policy is more fair. They also believe that if the policy were changed to 
be  less  redistributional,  then  investment  would  not  increase.  This  becomes  self-
confirming, because they choose the more redistributional policy. 
  Specifically, we consider the following simplified Alesina-Angeletos model. First 
the government moves, choosing either high redistribution (H) or low redistribution (L). 
Then a representative individual chooses either to invest (1) or not to invest (0). Finally, 
nature moves, assigning either good luck (G) or bad luck (B) with equal probability.
12 We  
normalize the base payoff of the investor to 0, with a premium of 2 for good luck, and a 
                                                 
12 The actual Alesina-Angeletos model is considerably more sophisticated having both heterogeneity in 
ability and allowing continuous choices of investment and taxes in an overlapping generations setting.   17 
benefit of investment of 2 and a cost of 1. These base  payoffs are also the actual payoffs 
under the low redistribution policy. Under the high redistribution policy the individual 
gets one minus the cost of investment (if any). The government gets the same utility as 
the investor plus a “fairness bonus” of   for the high redistribution policy. 
  First we analyze subgame perfection. In the subgame in which the government 
chooses low redistribution it is optimal to invest, and the utility of the investor and the 
government is 2. In the subgame in which the government chooses high redistribution it 
is optimal not to invest and the utility of the investor is one and that of the government is 
1  . So the optimal policy is low redistribution resulting in the utility of 2. 
  There is, however, a unitary self-confirming equilibrium in which the government 
sets high redistribution, believing that if it chooses high redistribution there will be no 
investment.  (Since  this  is  off  the  equilibrium  path,  the  belief  is  untested.)  On  the 
equilibrium path there is no investment and the investor gets 1, the government 1  . 
According to the governments beliefs, it chooses low redistribution there will still be no 
investment,  and  the  investor  will  still  get  1,  but  the  “fairness  bonus”  is  lost  so  the 
government gets only 1. Consequently this is self-confirming. Notice that this outcome is 
also the outcome of a Nash equilibrium: since low redistribution is off the equilibrium 
path,  it  is  in  fact  a  best  response  for  the  investor  not  to  invest  in  response  to  low 
redistribution.
13 However, while the Nash equilibrium has the same outcome as the self-
confirming equilibrium here it highlights a deficiency of Nash equilibrium: why would 
the investor respond to low redistribution by “punishing” the government and themselves 
with low investment? By way of contrast, the self-confirming equilibrium makes sense – 
provided the government does not discover that its beliefs are wrong. 
  Here too it is the case that experimentation with a slightly less redistributional 
policy should yield information that the increase in output more than compensates for the 
decrease in fairness. However, it is likely that redistributional policy impacts output only 
with a substantial lag, and there are many confounding factors, meaning that the signal is 
quite  noisy.  So  it  seems  plausible  that  this  information  about  the  relationship  would 
emerge only slowly. There may also be institutional constraints that make experiments 
                                                 
13 In fact in any two-player game where players have correct beliefs about Nature, any outcome of a unitary 
self-confirming equilibrium is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium, as shown  in Fudenberg and  Levine 
[1993a] and Fudenberg and Kreps [1995].   18 
rarer and more difficult than experiments by firms. This is consistent with the view that 
European policy has become less redistributional but only gradually so. 
4.3 The Sargent-Williams-Zha Inflation Model 
  The following simplified version of the Sargent, Williams and Zha [2006a] model 
of inflation has a non-Nash self-confirming equilibrium based on an incorrect beliefs 
about a Philips curve. In a sense this is the self-confirming opposite of the simple “Lucas 
critique” model we discussed at the start of the paper. 
We assume that there is a policy maker who chooses a monetary policy, which we 
take to be either high or low inflation, and a representative consumer who moves after 
observing the monetary policy and chooses either high or low unemployment. The policy 
maker prefers low inflation but is willing to chose high inflation if this leads to lower 
unemployment; for concreteness we will suppose that the policy maker’s payoff is the 
sum of an unemployment term and an inflation term, and that the policy maker gets 2 for 
low  unemployment,  0  for  high  unemployment,  1  for  low  inflation  and  0  for  high 
inflation.  
Regardless  of  what  inflation  policy  is  chosen,  the  representative  consumer’s 
payoffs are such that he will choose low unemployment. It follows that the subgame-
perfect equilibrium here is for the policy maker to chose low inflation; in this equilibrium 
the policy maker’s payoff is 3. There is, however, a unitary self-confirming equilibrium 
in  which  the  policy  maker  chooses  high  inflation  due  to  a  mistaken  belief  that  low 
inflation leads to high unemployment; here the policy maker’s payoff is only 1.
14  
  Obviously this model is a highly simplified version of a misperceived Phillip’s 
curve. Sargent, Williams and Zha argue that a misperceived Phillips curve resulting in a 
self-confirming equilibrium cannot adequately explain either the accelerating inflation of 
the  1970s  nor  the  dramatic  fall  in  inflation  in  the  1980s  U.S.  They  provide  a  more 
detailed model of Bayesian learning about the Phillips curve that allows misperception 
but also allows the misperception to be corrected as data accumulated. They argue that 
this learning model can explain many of the details of U.S. monetary policy and inflation 
                                                 
14 As in the Angeletos-Alesina model, this outcome is also the outcome of a Nash equilibrium where the 
consumer really does chose high unemployment after low inflation, but the same critique applies: why 
should the consumer do this?    19 
during 1970s and 80s. In Sargent, Williams and Zha [2006b] they use a related model to 
explain hyperinflationary episodes and monetary reform in South America. 
5. The Effectiveness of Learning 
  We now want to examine in greater detail the rate and effectiveness of learning in 
the “Lucas case” in which a policy thought a priori to be a good alternative to the status 
quo is in fact not, and the “self-confirming case” in which a policy thought a priori to be 
a poor alternative is in fact not. In each case, initial beliefs are in error; how much does 
this  lower  the  player’s  payoff  as  compared  to  the  situation  where  he  knows  the  true 
probabilities?  
  To focus thoughts, we will imagine that there is an existing status quo policy 
which has been in use for some period of time, and, as a result, has a known expected 
payoff that we may normalize to 0. We suppose that a single alternative not previously 
contemplated is proposed for the first time. In other words, we consider a two-armed 
bandit problem in which one arm has a known value, and the other (the “new” arm) has 
an unknown value.  
  Consider first the Lucas case. We may imagine that an econometrician comes to 
the policy maker with some evidence that a new policy (“high inflation”) would have 
previously unsuspected benefits (“low unemployment”). We suppose, moreover, that for 
the reasons described by  Lucas, that the econometrician is in error.  If the new “high 
inflation” regime is introduced, how long will it take before the policy maker discovers 
the error? To further focus thinking, let us suppose that the outcome of the new “high 
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If the payoff to success is +1 and the payoff to failure is –1 then the mean and variance of 


















so it is convenient to parameterize the prior by    rather than   .  
In the Lucas case, the prior is favorable for the new arm, so     , while the 
actual mean of the new arm is     . We will contrast this with the “self confirming 
case,” where the alternative arm is a priori thought to be inferior, so the prior mean 
   , while in fact it is superior, so that     .  Because there is a single risky arm, 
the optimal policy here takes the form of a stopping time:  once the agent uses the safe 
and uninformative arm, he uses it in all subsequent periods.  Hence if we let   be  the 
first date at which the safe arm is used the agent’s expected average discounted payoff 
with respect to the true distribution is  simply         . 
In the Lucas case,       and the ful-information optimum has payoff 0, so the 
agent’s loss compared to full information is          , which is minimal when 
      . In the self-confirming case, where      , the full-information payoff is 
    , so the agent’s loss compared to full information is      .  To facilitate the 
comparison  of  these  two  cases,  we  define          in  the  Lucas  case,  and  




   
 
   ,  
where     an indicator function which is 1 when the objectively correct arm is used 0 
otherwise.  Thus the agent’s loss compared to full information is 
    µ   in both 
cases. 
Consider first the case of complete myopia, so     . In the self-confirming case 
since     , the player will never try the alternative arm, and will remain stuck on the 
wrong  arm  forever.  Consequently     .  In  the  Lucas  case  the  player  will  pull  the 
wrong arm once, and again     . This is obvious, and not very interesting, but we can   21 
use it to boostrap to the case of small but non-zero discounting. For any given beliefs, if 
 is sufficiently small in the self-confirming case where      it will still not be optimal 
to try the alternative arm since the possible benefits (a gain forever) are outweighed by 
the cost of an anticipated mistake in the first period. Hence      still.  
Now consider the Lucas case, and suppose that the true value of  is near zero so 
that the true mean of the risky arm is approximately    . Moreover, the arm has little 
variance, so we may imagine as an approximation that the player draws     every period 
in which he uses the risky arm.. If the prior is given by    and the Gittins index is  























If  is small then the Gittins index   is near zero, and we have approximately 
          
So  for  small    and  small  sampling  variance  on  the  uncertain  arm,  we  have  the 
approximation in the Lucas case 
        . 
The worse the arm is thought to be – that is, the smaller is the prior mean   – and the 
less  strongly  held  that  belief  –  that  is,  the  smaller  is      –  the  greater  is  the 
effectiveness of learning. 
  Before doing more precise calculations, we can further firm up our intuition about 
the length of time it takes to learn in the Lucas and self-confirming cases by considering 
the situation where the player is very patient, that is  is near one. In the Lucas case this 
will increase the length of time it takes to switch back to the old correct arm, since it is no 
longer optimal to stop when the posterior mean reaches zero, but rather to continue until 
it is sufficiently negative. However, although the time it takes to learn increases, it is easy 
to show that  approaches 1 – that is the fraction of discounted time spent on the wrong 
arm goes to zero. In the impatient case, the player cares only about the first period, which   22 
by assumption is a mistake. In the patient case, the player only makes a mistake for a 
small (relative to the discount factor) fraction of his life, and so does not lose very much 
from the failed experiment. In the self-confirming case, however, the effect of increased 
patience is somewhat different. While an impatient player never learns, a patient player 
essentially always learns that the new arm is better – and since he begins playing the new 
arm immediately, the effective time to learn is zero. Hence a relatively myopic player’s 
payoff is higher in the Lucas case than in the self-confirming case; while a patient player 
gets about the full-information payoff in either case. 
  Next we report the results of some simulations of the effectiveness of learning.  
The Gittins index value is computed in the Appendix of Gittins [1988]. Gittins considers 
a binomial with a value of 1 on success and 0 on failure. In these units, our certain arm 
yields a sure payoff of 0.5, so the optimal rule is to stop as soon as the index falls below 
0.5. Let      be the posterior parameters after   observations; that is,     is the sum of 
the prior value of  and the number of successes (payoffs of +1), and     is sum the prior 
value    and the number of failures (payoffs of -1). We consider two different discount 
factors,       and     ,  where  the  latter  may  be  thought  of  roughly  as 
corresponding to annual data. Conveniently, for      in Gittins table, for       
stopping when the index falls below 0.5 corresponds to stopping when       , 
and for      the stopping rule for       is       . We extrapolated 
this rule for larger values of     , and ended the simulation when      for the case 
   , and when      when      leaving a maximum possible error of less 
than in the calculation of . 
In the table below, the yellow-shaded rows correspond to the Lucas case, where 
the prior mean on the risky arm is positive and the true mean is negative. The blue shaded 
arms report the results for the symmetric self-confirming cases obtained by switching the 
signs of the true mean     and the prior mean  . We report a range of priors for each 
discount factor; in each case a monte-carlo with 10,000 trials was run. 
   23 
Actual  Prior        Effectiveness  
              
-0.2  0.2  3  2  0.5  .102 
-0.2  0.2  3  2  0.9  .392 
-0.5  0.5  3  1  0.5  .061 
-0.5  0.5  3  1  0.9  .475 
-0.9  0.2  3  2  0.9  .706 
0.2  -0.2  2  3  0.5  .000 
0.2  -0.2  2  3  0.9  .506 
0.5  -0.5  1  3  0.5  .000 
0.5  -0.5  1  3  0.9  .000 
0.9  -0.2  2  3  0.9  .965 
 
The results show that the learning efficiency in the self-confirming case tends to be more 
extreme than in the Lucas case. In the self-confirming case the agent either does not 
experiment at all (so     ) or when  is sufficiently large the agent experiments and is 
very  likely  to  learn  the  true  optimum,  so    is  close  to  1.    (Recall  that  in  the  self-
confirming case the risky experiment is the full-information optimum, so the only way 
that    can  be  positive  but  less  than  1  is  if  the  agent  starts  out  experimenting  but 
eventually locks on to the safe arm.) In the Lucas case, experimenting with the risky arm 
is a mistake (given the true distribution); the agent eventually learns this, regardless of 
parameters, but in the cases we considered the initial losses have a non-trivial cost.    24 
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